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The above analysis is an example of the subchapter S traps which Judge
Hall criticized in her dissenting opinion as unintended by Congress. 4
Subchapter S was created to benefit small corporations realizing losses in
their initial tax years. 55 It seems ludicrous to argue that Congress intended
to penalize subchapter S corporations for going bankrupt, when sub-
chapter S was initally created to benefit small corporations incurring heavy
start-up costs. The termination of a subchapter S election through bank-
ruptcy can be avoided by simply including an estate in bankruptcy within
the definition of estate under section 1371(a). This could be accomplished
by revising Revenue Ruling 66-266.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Abdalla is a compromise solution, taking the middle
road between statutory language that would seem to preclude a NOL de-
duction in the year of a bankruptcy and broad legislative intent that man-
dates a full NOL flow through. As a result, shareholders of a bankrupt
subchapter S corporation will be allowed to deduct their pro rata share of
the corporation's NOL, but only to the extent that it is allocable to the
period preceding the bankruptcy.
David Stieber
Ability of a Lessee to Invoke Natural Gas Act Jurisdiction
Over the Reversionary Interest: California v. Southland
Royalty Co.
Gulf Oil Corporation held the exclusive right, under 1925 lease agree-
ments, to produce and market oil and natural gas from certain Texas real
estate' for a fixed fifty-year period.2 Gulf commenced sales of casinghead
gas3 from the subject property in 1951 to El Paso Natural Gas Company,
an interstate pipeline. In 1956, in compliance with the United States
Supreme Court decision of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,4 Gulf re-
54. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
1. There were two leases involved, one covering 45,771 acres in Crane County and the
other covering 19,840 acres in Ector County.
2. Gulf had contended in state court that its 50-year term did not include certain peri-
ods in which production was delayed. While the lease provisions stated that "the time of
such delay . . . shall not be counted against the leassee," the Court held this served only to
excuse the lessee from involuntary failure to engage in operations required by the lease.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 496 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1973).
3. Gas produced in connection with oil production. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 273
(4th ed. 1968).
4. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). In Phillips the Court held that a sale for resale by an independ-
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quested and was granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Federal Power Commission authorizing the sales.5 In anticipa-
tion of the lease's expiration, the holders of the reversionary interest6 made
arrangements to sell production from the remaining gas reserves to an in-
trastate buyer.7 Seeking to protect its supply, El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany petitioned the Federal Power Commission8 for a declaration that the
reversioners could not divert the gas to the intrastate market without ob-
taining abandonment approval under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act.9
The Commission ruled for El Paso Natural Gas Company, stating that
once gas is dedicated to the interstate market under a certificate of unlim-
ited duration, it may not be withdrawn without Commission approval.' °
Southland Royalty Company, a partial owner of the reversionary inter-
est, "1 sought review of the adverse ruling in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Gulf could not dedicate
more than it owned and was therefore incapable of encumbering the rever-
sionary interest.' 2  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.'3  Held,
reversed: The production and sale of natural gas under a certificate of
public convenience and necessity authorized by section 7(c) of the Natural
Gas Act creates an obligation to serve interstate commerce that attaches to
the gas itself and binds all who exercise dominion over it, regardless of the
manner in which dominion is acquired. California v. Southland Royalty
Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978).
ent producer was a jurisdictional event under the Act. The effect of the holding was to
subject independent producers of natural gas to the same certification procedures which had
been developed to apply to interstate pipelines. The requirement was promulgated as a rule
in 18 C.F.R. § 157.23 (1978).
5. Gulf's certificate was one of many issued in a consolidated proceeding. The certifi-
cates issued in this proceeding were determined to be of unlimited duration in Sun Oil Co. v.
FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
6. There were over one hundred separate reversioners for the Crane County lease
alone. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.P.C. 145, 10 P.U.R.4th 344, 345 (1975).
7. Diverting gas from the interstate market was motivated by the higher prices then
prevailing in the unregulated intrastate market. Intrastate sales have since been subjected to
federal price regulation by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, § 105, 92
Stat. 3366 (1978)(to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 331).
8. Texaco, Inc., holder of a reversionary interest in the Ector County lease, petitioned
for a declaration on the same question. Although the interests of the two petitioners were
adverse, the cases were consolidated. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.P.C. 145, 10 P.U.R.4th
344 (1975).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
10. 54 F.P.C. 145, 10 P.U.R.4th 344, 348 (1975).
II. Southland had an interest in both properties, but its interest in the Crane County
lease was much more substantial. Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1976).
12. Id.
13. 433 U.S. 907 (1977). The writs were filed by El Paso Natural Gas Company, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, successor to the Federal Power Commission under
the Department of Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-7352 (West Supp. 1977)
[both agencies are hereinafter referred to as the Commission], and the State of California




I. THE NATURAL GAS ACT AND ITS EXPANDING JURISDICTIONAL
SCOPE
The Natural Gas Act' 4 was enacted in 1938 in response to a Federal
Trade Commission investigation 5 of the structure of the natural gas in-
dustry. The industry at that time consisted of three well-defined tiers: pro-
ducers, which extracted the gas from the ground; interstate pipelines,
which bought from the producers and transported the gas to local distribu-
tors; and local distributors, which sold directly to municipal and industrial
users of the gas. 6 The interstate pipelines enjoyed a monopoly position
vis-a-vis the local distributors and were able to extract from them a price
far in excess of the pipelines' cost 7 in transactions that the states were
prohibited from regulating by the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 8 The legislative history indicates that in enacting the Natu-
ral Gas Act, Congress intended to provide for federal jurisdiction over the
interstate pipelines, thus closing the gap in which the states were unable to
act.' 9 Congress, however, did not intend to usurp state authority in areas
where state regulation was permissible.2"
The jurisdictional scope of the Natural Gas Act is spelled out in section
1(b),2 which provides for jurisdiction over the activities of interstate trans-
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
15. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 84-A (1936).
16. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 691 (1954) (Clark J., dissenting).
See also Note, New Approaches by the FPC to the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers.- an
Evaluation, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1200, 1202 (1964).
17. See generally Conine & Niebrugge, Dedication under the Natural Gas Act Extent
and Escape, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 735, 738 (1977); Flittie & Armour, The Natural GasAct Expe-
rience-A Study in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure to Control the Legislative
Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448, 449 (1965).
18. See Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924), holding that state
regulation of the interstate pipelines would be a burden on interstate commerce, impermissi-
ble under the commerce clause. See also Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec.
Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), which discussed similar problems with state regulation of the inter-
state movement of electricity.
19. H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); 81 CONG. REC. 6720 (1937).
20. "It is therefore the purpose of this legislation to close the gap now existing between
Federal and State regulation .... " Id. at 6723. The legislative purpose has been acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court: "The purpose of [the Act] was ... to preserve in the States
powers of regulation in areas in which the States are constitutionally competent to act."
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947). See also FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944); Public Utils. Comm'n v. United Fuel Co., 317 U.S. 456,
467 (1943). The extent to which present-day judicial thinking has deviated from this view is
illustrated by Corporation Comm'n v. FPC, 415 U.S. 961 (1974) (mem.) (enjoining constitu-
tionally permissible state regulatory activity), and Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963) (holding constitutionally permissible state activity invalid be-
cause it conflicts with federal jurisdiction granted by the Act).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976) states:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial,
or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation
or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or
to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distri-
bution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
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portation 2 and interstate sale for resale of natural gas and over natural-
gas companies.23 Three areas are specifically exempted from the Act's
coverage: any other transportation or sale, encompassing both intrastate
transportation and sales and direct sales not for resale; local distribution
and the facilities connected therewith; and the production or gathering of
natural gas. The trend in judicial interpretation of the Act has been to
extend its jurisdictional scope, primarily through a narrow reading of the
various statutory exceptions.
The trend is most notable in the judicial treatment of the "production or
gathering" exception. This exception had served for several years to pro-
vide a blanket exemption from the Act's coverage for the independent pro-
ducer,24 even when the producer engaged in activities that would
otherwise be jurisdictional, such as interstate sales for resale. The FPC
had so interpreted the Act, 25 not seeking to exercise jurisdiction over in-
dependent producers. This interpretation is consistent with the Act's pur-
pose because independent producers are susceptible to state
regulation 26and thus are not within the area that the Act was intended to
address.27 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,28 however, the Supreme
Court ruled that sales for resale made by an independent producer occur
after "production or gathering" activities have been concluded and are
therefore not within the statutory exception. The Court reasoned that the
statutory language granting jurisdiction over transportation or sales indi-
cates an intent to regulate producers as well as pipelines, since pipelines
engage in these activities concurrently and not separately. The conjunc-
tion "or" would be unnecessary if only pipelines were sought to be regu-
lated.29 The Court recognized that prior decisions had held the activities
in question to be within the state regulatory power 30 and thus seemingly
not part of -the regulatory gap which the Act was intended to address. It
concluded, however, that the cases so holding had expanded the scope of
22. In accord with established constitutional doctrine the specific sales transaction need
not cross a state line to be in interstate commerce; the gas need merely be committed to an
interstate journey. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 687-89 (1947).
23. "Natural-gas company" is defined as "a person engaged in the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale."
15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1976).
24. See Crenshaw, The Regulation of Natural Gas, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 338
(1954). Nevertheless, both prior and subsequent to the Phillps decision, legislation has fre-
quently been attempted which would expressly exempt independent producers from Com-
mission jurisdiction. Twice both houses have passed such a measure and each time a
Presidential veto was employed. H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 1758, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See general y Note, supra note 16, at 1217-18.
25. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951); Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200
(1940).
26. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950); Cities Serv. Gas Co.
.v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
27. H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); 81 CONG. REC. 6721 (1937).
28. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
29. Id. at 681-82. For a critique of the Court's analysis, see Flittie & Armour, supra
note 17, at 470.
30. Cases so holding include Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950);
Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
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the state power beyond the original 1938 limits. Hence, the states were
unable to regulate these activities at the date of the Act's enactment, and
the activities were within the jurisdictional grant.3 ' Subsequent decisions
have extended the Phillips holding by upholding FPC jurisdiction over
sales by independent producers made after gathering but prior to process-
ing,32 sales made at the wellhead,33 and sales of gas in place.34
The remaining exception clauses of section l(b) have been similarly lim-
ited, although the impact of such limitations has not been as great. The
exception of "any other transportation or sale" exempts two activities from
federal regulation: direct sales to end users and intrastate transportation
or sales. Judicial decisions interpreting this exception primarily have in-
volved the direct sale situation.35 A seller may experience difficulty in
classifying a particular transaction as a direct sale under the test formu-
lated in Caif/ornia v. Lo- Vaca Gathering Co. 36 In Lo- Vaca a producer had
sold gas to an interstate pipeline, the contract stipulating that the gas was
solely for the pipeline's personal use in its boilers. 37 The parties used care
in monitoring the delivery levels so that in fact no more gas was taken than
was used for internal purposes.3' The Court held, however, that since
there was physical commingling of the producer's gas with other gas, some
of the gas delivered would actually be resold. The transaction, therefore,
was not a direct sale, but a sale for resale.39 Even if the transaction quali-
fies as a direct sale under the strict Lo- Vaca test, the Commission may
properly regulate such activity indirectly by refusing to certify the trans-
portation facilities necessary to effect the sale.4" Additionally, the Com-
mission may affect direct sales by imposing a curtailment plan, which
31. 347 U.S. at 684. It is not, however, necessary to conclude from the fact that the 1950
decisions were the first to uphold state jurisdiction, that such jurisdiction was lacking before
those decisions. The more likely inference is that the problem simply was not before the
courts until 1950. See Flittie & Armour, supra note 17, at 463 n.85.
32. Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957).
33. Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
956 (1958).
34. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392 (1965). But see
FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949) (holding that a sale of undeveloped
reserves was within the production or gathering exception). Panhandle was distinguished in
United Gas because United Gas involved the sale of reserves for which the supply was
proven and the production facilities were well developed. The Panhandle holding may still
apply to the sale of substantially undeveloped reserves that are not related to interstate com-
merce. See Conine & Niebrugge, supra note 17, at 747-48.
35. This is because the line of demarcation between intrastate and interstate commerce
has been drawn in other contexts and does not present an issue unique to the Act. See note
22 supra and accompanying text.
36. 379 U.S. 366 (1965).
37. Id. at 367.
38. Id. at 368.
39. Id. at 369. This doctrine is termed a "molecular theory" and is sharply criticized by
Justice Harlan in his dissent. Id. at 371-77. For a comprehensive treatment of the commin-
gling theory, see Sullivan, Federal Power Commission Jurisdiction over Commingled Sales of
Natural Gas. A Problem in Judicial and Administrative Legislation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
638 (1962).
40. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961). In this case the
FPC refused to certify facilities that would make possible a direct sale for industrial use
because it feared that the sale would restrict pipeline capacity available for other uses and
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allocates delivery quotas for a seller experiencing a reduction in supply.4'
Judicial limitation of the third exception, "local distribution," has been
countered by legislative amendment. In FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co.42 the
Court refused to apply the local distribution exception to a company en-
gaged in distribution to consumers on a statewide basis, holding that gas
was not in local distribution until the pipeline pressure was reduced.43
Congress reacted in 1954 by passing the Hinshaw Amendment," which
returned statewide distribution to the realm of exclusive state jurisdiction
and in explicit language made the pressure level irrelevant.
The judicial practice of narrowly interpreting the statutory exceptions to
Natural Gas Act jurisdiction has had substantial impact on the independ-
ent producer of natural gas. The Phillips decision first subjected the in-
dependent producer to FPC jurisdiction, and subsequent cases have
expanded the range of producer activities deemed jurisdictional.45 Appli-
cation of the statutory regulatory framework to the independent producer,
however, was not contemplated by Congress. As a result, several provi-
sions of the Act can be applied to the independent producer only by a
strained reading of the statutory language. Application of the Act's certifi-
cation requirements46 to the independent producer has been especially
difficult, and the resulting statutory interpretation has contributed to a
further extension of the Act's jurisdictional scope.
II. NATURAL GAS ACT CERTIFICATION OF THE INDEPENDENT
PRODUCER
The certification requirements of the Natural Gas Act are contained in
sections 7(b) and (c). Section 7(C) 4 7 requires that natural gas companies be
issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity before commencing
that the high price would have an adverse effect on gas prices generally. The Commission
was upheld.
41. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972). Jurisdiction was based
on transportation, not sales. The Court indicated that the "other transportation or sales"
exception forecloses only rate-making jurisdiction over direct sales. Id. at 637-38.
42. 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
43. Id. at 472-73. The FPC did not take full advantage of its jurisdictional victory in
this instance, imposing only accounting standards on companies in this situation, and declin-
ing to exercise rate-making jurisdiction. See Flittie & Armour, supra note 17, at 483-84.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1976). The amendment exempted all sales made within a state
"if all the natural gas so received is ultimately consumed within such State." The legislative
history, 99 CONG. REc. 10,563 (1953), and FPC interpretation, 18 C.F.R. §§ 152.1-.4 (1978),
indicate that this section is to apply only where actual state regulation is being exercised.
45. See notes 32-34 & 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(b), (c) (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976), which provides:
No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon
completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the
transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or
acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in
force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or opera-
tions. . ..
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jurisdictional activities, and section 7(b)4' requires a second certificate
before jurisdictional "facilities" or "service" can be abandoned. Section
7(b) is difficult to apply to independent producers because the function of a
producer is to make "sales," not to provide "service" or to construct "facil-
ities.",49 To bring the independent producer within the terms of section
7(b) it is necessary to consider that "sales" made by the independent pro-
ducer are a "service."
The identification of sales as services has consequences affecting certifi-
cation procedures under the Act, as illustrated in the case of Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC.5° In Sunray the FPC had tendered a certificate
of unlimited duration5 under section 7(c) to a producer, in spite of the
producer's contention that the agency lacked authority to tender a certifi-
cate effective beyond the term of the producer's contractual obligation to
his buyer. The producer reasoned that the Commission was empowered to
authorize only proposed sales, and the only sales proposed by the applica-
tion were those to be made under the original contract.52 The Court re-
jected the producer's argument, identifying the sales as a service and
holding that the underlying service is not limited by the duration of the
initial sales contract.53 The Commission can thus certify the underlying
service for an unlimited duration, despite the limited term of the contrac-
tual sales obligation.54 Once commenced, the service cannot be aban-
doned without Commission approval under section 7(b).55
The Sunray holding allowed the FPC to require any person making an
interstate sale for resale of natural gas to operate under a certificate of
unlimited duration. The certified person could then be prevented indefi-
nitely from diverting gas to the intrastate market. Gas sold interstate
could be considered dedicated to interstate commerce.5" The FPC could
48. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976), which provides:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of
such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first
had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the
available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of
service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or
necessity permit such abandonment.
49. See Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 160, 163 (1960) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Conine & Niebrugge, supra note 17, at 798, 802.
50. 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
51. The significance of a certificate of unlimited duration is that activities under such a
certificate can never be terminated without obtaining abandonment approval, whereas a
limited certificate in effect offers a "pregranted abandonment" at the expiration of the certifi-
cate term. The FPC had contended that it had no authority to grant a limited certificate, but
this contention was rejected in FPC v. Moss, 424 U.S. 494 (1976). Despite its authority to
grant a limited certificate, the Commission has the option of tendering an unlimited one in
virtually every case under the Sunray holding. See notes 53, 54 infra and accompanying
text.
52. 364 U.S. at 148.
53. Id. at 151-54.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 153.
56. The concept of dedication is not expressly mentioned in the Act but nevertheless
plays an important role in its judicial interpretation. For a thorough discussion of the con-
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also prevent diversion of dedicated gas reserves by subsequent assignees of
the certified party by considering the assignment itself to be an abandon-
ment, but waiving the requirement of abandonment approval if the as-
signor assures equivalent interstate service from his assignee.57 Although
neither the Supreme Court in Sunray nor the FPC in developing these
practices focused on the jurisdictional issue, there is no conflict between
either practice and the section 1(b) standards. Persons, such as the pro-
ducer in Sunray, who have made interstate sales for resale are susceptible
to jurisdiction as natural-gas companies.58 Subsequent assignees of these
persons are less clearly within the jurisdictional ambit, but their consent to
agency jurisdiction can be required before the assignment is approved.
When, however, dominion over the reserves shifts not by contractual as-
signment but by operation of law, such as on the expiration of a lease,
jurisdictional problems arise. In this instance, the FPC has no leverage to
procure the reversioner's consent to provide interstate service because it
cannot prevent the termination of the lease.5 9 Additionally, if the rever-
sioner has engaged in no jurisdictional activities he is not susceptible to
jurisdiction as a natural-gas company.
III. CALIFORNIA V. SOUTHLAND ROYALTY Co.
The substantive issue addressed by the Court in California v. Southland
Royalty Co. was whether a lessee natural-gas company under a fixed-term
lease could, by making interstate sales of natural gas under a section 7(c)
certificate of unlimited duration, obligate the lessor upon reversion to con-
tinue serving the interstate market. The Court framed the issue in light of
the fundamental purpose of the Natural Gas Act "to assure an adequate
and reliable supply of gas at reasonable prices"6 and, in a four-to-three
decision,6" extended application of the service obligation concept devel-
oped in Sunray to parties acquiring dominion over dedicated gas by opera-
tion of law. The Court noted the jurisdictional issue only briefly and
cept, see Conine & Niebrugge, supra note 17. With the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432),
dedication is no longer determinative of whether the gas will be regulated but of whether the
special price regulations for dedicated gas in § 104 are to be applied. The 1978 Act defines
dedicated gas in § 2(18), which is discussed infra at note 85. Section 601(a)(1) (A) provides
that gas not dedicated on the day before the enactment date of the 1978 Act is not subject to
the provisions of the Natural Gas Act. Thus, in effect, there can be no new dedications of
gas after November 10, 1978.
57. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. FPC, 533 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1976). The requirement that
the assignor assure equivalent interstate service has been made a formal regulation. 18
C.F.R. § 2.64(a) (1978).
58. For the statutory definition of a "natural-gas company," see note 23 supra.
59. A lessor's reversionary interest in a fixed-term lease is a fully vested interest at the
time of the lease's execution.
60. 436 U.S. at 523.
61. Justices Stewart and Powell took no part in consideration of the opinion. The ma-
jority opinion was delivered by Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. The composition and argument of the dissent are discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 75-81 infra.
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termed it "somewhat beside the point.' '62
Sunray was cited by the Court for the principle that the underlying serv-
ice obligation arising from the dedication of gas could not be terminated
by private contractual arrangements.63 The Court stated that the FPC had
acted reasonably in interpreting the obligation as one attaching to the gas
itself,64 thus imposing federal jurisdiction on all parties with the power to
make sales from the dedicated reserves. 65 The court of appeals had re-
jected the Commission's view of the service obligation on the basis of local
property law, holding that since a lessee under a fixed-term lease has no
right in the reversionary interest, he can create no rights in third persons
affecting that interest. 66 The lessee cannot dedicate gas which he does not
own.67 The Supreme Court, however, dismissed this argument as arising
from an ambiguity in the term "dedicate., 68 The gas in question, said the
Court, has not been dedicated in the sense of being surrendered to public
use; it has merely been placed within a regulatory category. 69 There has
been no taking of property in the due process sense because there is statu-
tory assurance of a just and reasonable rate of return.7°
The Court also pointed out that a property owner entering into an oil
and gas lease could reasonably expect that the lessee would make sales in
interstate commerce and could therefore anticipate that federal jurisdiction
62. 436 U.S. at 528.
63. Id. at 525.
64. The service obligation, however, attaches only to gas reserves specifically referred to
in the original application for a § 7(c) certificate, Harrison v. FERC, 567 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.
1978), and only when deliveries from the reserves are commenced. Wessely Energy Corp. v.
Arkansas La. Gas Co., 438 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aJJ'd, Nos. 77-1749-50 (10th Cir.
Jan. 9, 1979). Wessely was decided between the court of appeals and Supreme Court deci-
sions in Southland Royalty and its holding was based on alternative grounds. First, the
holding of the court of appeals in Southland Royalty that a lessee's dedication has no effect
on the reversionary interest was followed in determining that dedication by a lessee also has
no effect on a subsequent lessee of the same reserves. Secondly, "whatever the ultimate
disposition of Southland in the Supreme Court," 438 F. Supp. at 365, it was decided that
jurisdiction does not attach to any reserves until the commencement of deliveries.
65. 436 U.S. at 525. The FPC admitted in originally adopting this view that it was
supported by no case directly in point. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.P.C. 145, 149, 10
P.U.R.4th 344, 348 (1975). The Court held that Lo- Vaca authorized basing jurisdiction on
the physical flow of the gas. Neither that decision nor Sunray, however, hold that jurisdic-
tion attaches to the gas as such; rather both speak in terms of jurisdiction over activities and
persons. Compare the formulation in Harper Oil Co. v. FPC, 284 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir.
1960) (emphasis added) ("[O]nce an independent producer of gas has dedicated his produc-
tion to interstate commerce and thereby has come under the jurisdiction of the Commission,
he remains thereunder as long as production continues.") with the formulation in Southland
Royalty.
66. Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1976).
67. Id.
68. 436 U.S. at 527.
69. Id. The Court analogized the regulatory status to a change in zoning that the lessee
has the power to pursue. 436 U.S. at 527-28 n.5. The Court thus hints that natural gas
dedication is not an encumbrance in the traditional property sense. An argument can never-
theless be made that such status is properly includable in a title abstract, since it is an impor-
tant limitation on the use of property.
70. 436 U.S. at 527. A "just and reasonable" rate is assured by § 4 of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 717c(a) (1976).
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might be invoked' 7 1 citing Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Motey.72
Thus there is no unfairness in subjecting the lessor to federal regulations
promulgated subsequent to the lease.7 3 A final factor in the Court's analy-
sis was the fear that if a contrary holding were reached, Natural Gas Act
jurisdiction could be easily avoided through manipulation of lease ar-
rangements.7 4 The Court referred again to the broad purpose of the Natu-
ral Gas Act and emphasized that local property law distinctions should not
be allowed to hinder the Commission in effectuating this purpose.75
The opinion drew a dissent from Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. The dissent pointed out that while the
lessee, Gulf, was a natural-gas company as defined in the Act, Southland
Royalty, having engaged in no jurisdictional activities," was not and thus
was not susceptible to jurisdiction by the terms of section 1(b).7 7 Nor did
Southland become a natural-gas company by succeeding to the interest of
a natural-gas company. A lessee's interest doesnot succeed to the lessor; it
expires. 78 The dissent distinguished the Sunray case because it involved
merely the scope of a party's dedication; Southland Royalty presented the
threshold question of whether a party was affected by a dedication at all.7 9
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority's fear that lease provisions
could be structured to escape regulation. The dissent noted that in the
instant case bad faith was not an issue since the lease was negotiated years
before the Act was passed 80 and suggested that adverse effects could be
neutralized if the Commission conditioned the issuance of future certifi-
cates on the consent of all necessary parties, including the lessor.8' As a
practical consideration, the dissent noted that there are very few fixed-term
71. 436 U.S. at 528-29.
72. 219 U.S. 467 (1911). Mottley held that one can reasonably anticipate that a contract
affecting interstate commerce may be subsequently made unenforceable through use of the
commerce power.
73. This analysis is questionable, however, when the regulations affect sales from the
reversionary interest. Since the lessee is without authority to make these sales, the lessor
would not expect the lessee to be able to affect them.
74. 436 U.S. at 530.
75. Id.
76. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972), it was held that royalty owners do not make a sale of gas by the mere retention of
their interests. But see Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. FERC, 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978) (fol-
lowing Southland Royalty and holding that a royalty owner who has the option of taking his
royalty in kind must file for abandonment before he can withdraw in kind payments from
the interstate market).
77. 436 U.S. at 539.
78. Id. at 540.
79. Id. at 538. Cases involving railroad abandonment under the Interstate Commerce
Act were held inapplicable because these cases made no attempt to impose agency jurisdic-
tion to parties not susceptible under the statute as a "common carrier." Id. at 543. The
majority had referred to these authorities only in a footnote. Id. at 529 n.6.
80. Id. at 541.
81. 1d. at 545. The majority's objection to this plan is found in Sunray, 364 U.S. at 152,
stating that the Commission cannot achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly. 436 U.S.
at 530. The dissent's reply to this is that it is irrelevant since the Commission has the direct
power to withhold a certificate pending a determination that the applicant has the power to
make an unlimited dedication. Id. at 525 n.24.
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natural gas leases in existence.82
The dissent's analysis fits squarely within the statutory framework of
section 1(b) by focusing on the issue of whether Southland Royalty is a
natural-gas company and rejecting claims of jurisdiction not based on a
statutory category. The jurisdictional scope of the Natural Gas Act is con-
tained within section 1 (b), which provides for jurisdiction over certain ac-
tivities and over the natural-gas companies who engage in these activities.
The statute authorizes no additional category of jurisdiction attaching to
the gas itself and reaching persons such as Southland, who are not natural-
gas companies and have not engaged in jurisdictional activities. The ma-
jority opinion upholds the exercise of Commission jurisdiction in an area
outside the positive jurisdictional grant of section 1(b) for the first time.
Earlier decisions had expanded the Commission's jurisdiction by narrowly
interpreting the section 1(b) exceptions, but did not deal with areas outside
the positive jurisdictional grant. These decisions, however, did make pos-
sible the Southland Royalty decision by initially subjecting the independ-
ent producer to Natural Gas Act regulation.83 The service obligation
concept was developed as a means of adapting statutory language designed
for the interstate pipelines to the situation of the independent producer.84
Southland Royally carries the service obligation to its logical extreme by
extending it to cover anyone with dominion over dedicated gas.85 Never-
theless, it presents a qualitatively different approach to Natural Gas Act
82. Id. at 544.
83. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
85. The conference report on the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-62 1,
92 Stat. 3351 (1978) (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432), states that the definition of
dedicated gas contained in § 2(18) is designed to limit further extention of the Southland
Royalty holding. S. REP. No. 1126, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1978). The conference report
indicates that if the right to explore and sell gas that would otherwise be dedicated is vested
in another person by the reversion of a lease, then the gas is not dedicated unless it was
actually sold in interstate commerce for resale on May 31, 1978. Id. at 72. Under this test, if
Southland had ceased interstate sales while the litigation was pending, the gas would not be
dedicated. Similarly, other lessors in Southland's position who stopped interstate sales be-
lieving that they were under no obligation to continue them would not have their gas dedi-
cated. The distinction seems unfair, since the only reason that Southland was making
interstate sales on May 31, 1978, was that it had reached an understanding with the FPC that
these sales themselves would not result in a dedication if Southland prevailed in the litiga-
tion. 436 U.S. at 523. Moreover, § 2(18) is not well drafted to achieve the result that the
conference report suggests. Section 2(18)(B)(iii) provides that natural gas is not dedicated:
which, but for this clause, would be committed or dedicated to interstate com-
merce . . . by reason of the action of any person (including any successor in
interest thereof, other than by means of any reversion of a leasehold interest),
if on May 31, 1978 (I) neither that person, nor any affiliate thereof, had any
right to explore for, develop, produce, or sell such natural gas; and (II) such
natural gas was not being sold in interstate commerce (within the meaning of
the Natural Gas Act) for resale . ...
The section achieves its intended purpose only if the use of the word "person" in the clause
beginning "if on May 31, 1978" carries with it the parenthetical phrase "(including any
successor in interest)" used to qualify "person" earlier in the section. The drafters could
have achieved the identical result with much less strain by deleting the parenthetical from its
present position and inserting it after the second occurrence of "person." The phrase is
unnecessary in its present position because a successor in interest cannot effect a dedication
of gas. Moreover, the present placement of the parenthetical potentially subjects the section
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